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Neuroaesthetics and the Trouble with Beauty

• Bevil R. Conway,
• Alexander Rehding

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• Published: March 19, 2013
• https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.1001504

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Citation: Conway BR, Rehding A (2013) Neuroaesthetics and the Problem with Dazzler. PLoS Biol 11(3): e1001504. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.1001504

Published: March 19, 2013

Copyright: © 2013 Conway, Rehding. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

Funding: This piece of work was supported by the National Science Foundation (Grant 0918064). The NSF had no role in report design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.

Competing interests: The authors have alleged that no competing interests exist.

The famous nineteenth-century psychophysicist Gustav Fechner was also a poet and art critic. Armed with the tools of scientific discipline, Fechner sought to reconcile his various interests. He would doubtless be interested past technological developments in neuroscience that have revealed the operations of neurons at cellular resolution and have enabled the states to peer almost unnoticed into each other's working brains. But can these tools advance our understanding of aesthetics beyond Fechner's insights [1]? The nascent field of neuroaesthetics claims it can. Here we consider what questions this new field is poised to respond. We underscore the importance of distinguishing betwixt beauty, art, and perception—terms often conflated past "aesthetics"—and place adjacent fields of neuroscience such as awareness, perception, attention, reward, learning, memory, emotions, and decision making, where discoveries volition probable be informative.

Aesthetics and Neuroscience

Aesthetics has a circuitous history. The term derives from the Greek "perception" and was coined by Alexander Baumgarten in 1750 as the study of sensory knowledge. But following Immanuel Kant's Critique of Judgment in 1790 [two], aesthetics began focusing on the concept of beauty, in nature and in fine art. During the nineteenth century, the term became largely synonymous with the philosophy of art. These three connotations—perception, dazzler, fine art—bespeak in dissimilar directions but are ofttimes conflated in neuroaesthetics.

Kant is a preferred philosopher amongst neuroaestheticians, no doubt because of his towering stature in the history of Western idea. He pursued a universalist approach to beauty, an appealing concept for neuroscientists because it suggests a discrete neural basis. But Kant'due south concept of beauty has been severely criticized in light of the prevailing pluralism of artistic styles. To make matters more complicated, there is no consensus on the nature of beauty. Kant'south understanding of beauty was predicated on an attitude of "disinterested contemplation" [2], whereas Friedrich Nietzsche roundly dismissed this notion and underlined the impact of sensual allure [3]. For the poet John Keats, dazzler equaled truth [4], while Stendhal, the French novelist, characterized dazzler as the "promise of happiness" [5]. More recently, Elaine Scarry described beauty as an urge to echo [6]. While each of these theories is respected, not one is universally accepted. Partly this diversity of opinions is connected to the unlike functions that dazzler holds within various philosophical systems, being sometimes viewed in connection with epistemology or with ethics. One goal of neuroaesthetics is to get to the lesser of the problem of artistic beauty. How can this exist accomplished?

Experiences of beauty are often deeply moving, and their importance to the human status invites a neuroscientific explanation. Merely while deep emotional reactions are often associated with beauty, being moved does not e'er signal an instance of beauty. Consider hearing well-nigh a disaster, celebrating a sports victory, or smelling a long-forgotten scent. These experiences are ameliorate described as "sympathy," "bliss," and "memory," rather than experiences of beauty. If neuroaesthetics is to be concerned specifically with beauty, information technology must draw distinctions between mechanisms for such disparate reactions. Since many experiences of beauty are related to art, neuroaestheticians have focused their attention on the analysis of artworks. For example, Ramachanran [seven], Zeki [viii], and Kandel [9] have presented case studies focusing on classical Indian art, American and European modernists, and the Viennese Secessionists. Explicitly or implicitly, these studies aim to extract rules that would lead to a practical definition of beauty, connecting features of objects and neural activeness. Zeki, for example, argues that the power of Alexander Calder'due south sculptures derives from the blackness-and-white moving parts, potent activators of the brain's movement-processing heart.

It may be no coincidence that the art these three authors concord up relates to the culture in which they were each raised. One potential danger in aesthetic projects is to universalize i'south subjective convictions and assume that an feel of beauty is common to all. Projecting from private subjective experience is deceptive, for there is ample testify that notions of dazzler vary betwixt cultures and are mutable even within a culture—simply recall of fast-changing trends in fashion. Moreover, the equation (art = beauty) rests on shaky ground. Throughout history, artists have created deeply moving artwork that is emphatically not beautiful; Goya's Saturn Devouring One of His Sons (Effigy 1) provides a famous historical example. Big swaths of twentieth-century art have greatly expanded—or entirely disavowed—notions of beauty. Such distinctions may seem picky, but interdisciplinary work such as neuroaesthetics relies on shared principles, and requires heightened attention to conceptual clarity.

Neuroscience has provided a heuristic outlining how sensory signals are candy by the nervous system to yield behavior [x],[eleven]. Signals from sensory epithelia such every bit the retina or basilar membrane are processed in the cognitive cortex by a series of areas that compute descriptions of the world: what or where objects are. These encephalon areas transport signals to other brain structures that are responsible for evaluating options against expected rewards—attaching significance to the sensory descriptions—and ultimately for making decisions, guided by learning, retentiveness, and emotions. Below we fence that a successful neuroaesthetics will include the written report of each of these stages of processing every bit they relate to handling, encoding, and generating aesthetic experiences, rather than an attempt to derive a single universal neural underpinning of what constitutes beauty.

Beginning Steps in Neuroaesthetics: Sensation, Perception, and Art

One arroyo commonly included under the umbrella of neuroaesthetics involves examining art objects in museums. Hither the complexity of establishing "beauty" is obviated past treating artworks as products of a massive empirical experiment. By analogy with evolutionary theory, the assumption is that the tiny number of works that survive the selective pressures exerted by collectors, cultural institutions, and fads are enriched for the force of their furnishings on the nervous system. Using this arroyo, studies have uncovered various creative strategies reflecting fundamental operations of the neural mechanisms for awareness and perception [7],[8],[12]–[14]. For example, depictions of shadows in paintings oft do not correspond to the light sources that cause them [fifteen]. Such unnoticed deviations from veracity reveal of import adaptations of the brain to ecological pressures during development and development—in the case of shadows, the human relationship of objects to light sources is in flux and therefore non a stable feature. Similarly, analysis of portraits has been insightful, showing that the outer profile of a face is more than of import for face recognition than the precise configuration of features [sixteen]. And paintings by Paul Cezanne, Henri Matisse, and Claude Monet show how these artists capitalized upon the neural mechanisms of color [17]. This line of research is often described as the neuroscience of fine art, rather than neuroaesthetics, since it does not test for beauty [13]. The approach may reveal the perceptually relevant properties of visual stimuli—contributing to aesthetics every bit Baumgarten divers information technology—just these properties are neither necessary nor sufficient features of beautiful objects. An Alexander Calder sculpture may consist of optimal stimuli for the brain's motion center, only this aspect of the work does not make information technology beautiful. The fine art simply provides a fascinating sit-in of the computations of the brain's movement-perception circuits, and the genius of the artists for discovering them.

Information technology is an open question whether an analysis of artworks, no matter how celebrated, will yield universal principles of beauty. Compositional principles such as the gilt ratio are intriguing possible universals, and captured the attending of Fechner, simply despite mathematical entreatment, the golden rectangle is not the favorite rectangle shape of most people [18]. I possible almost-universal may be the appeal of certain female facial features (symmetry, high cheekbones, large optics) and a 0.7 waist-to-hip ratio [19] or high body mass index [20]. Explanations for these preferences depend on a correlation betwixt the attributes and reproductive fettle. Still celebrated representations of female dazzler across history can deviate considerably from the 0.7 rule, and ratio preferences vary across cultures [21],[22]. Depictions of reproductive fitness can be sexually appealing and contribute to aesthetic appeal, merely such depictions are, again, neither necessary nor sufficient for beauty. Some other possible universal concerns the intriguing discovery that painters typically center one heart along the horizontal axis of a moving picture [23], taken to indicate "subconscious principles…operating in our artful judgments." But the trend towards center-centering has declined dramatically during and after avant-garde movements such as those led by Picasso [13]. Whether this decline is attributable to the relative reject of beauty every bit a driving strength in artistic cosmos or indicates a cultural shift in aesthetic preferences is unclear. Using celebrated works as empirical information to understand beauty might be a worthwhile gambit, merely nosotros doubt that conclusions can be extended across peoples, times, and cultures. The only universal feature of beauty also our capacity to experience it appears to exist its mutability, itself perhaps a topic for neuroscience.

A Beauty Heart?

Fechner was well aware of the pitfalls of philosophical aesthetics and aimed to reformulate the field "from the ground upwards." His appreciation of the inherently subjective nature of beauty led him to start with feelings of pleasure and displeasure elicited by art, since these constituted for him the lesser line beyond which further analysis was impossible. Contemporary neuroscience has gone much further. A recent report claims that "all works that appear beautiful to a subject have a single encephalon-based characteristic, which is that they take as a correlate of experiencing them a alter in force of [fMRI] activity within the mOFC [medial orbitofrontal cortex]" [24]. Leaving bated methodological challenges [25],[26], is such a correlation meaningful to understanding aesthetics?

Subjectivist studies such as these overcome the difficulty of defining beauty by asking the participants to first charge per unit visual objects or sounds [24],[27]. Brain activeness of each subject is and so assessed to their own set of "beautiful" versus "ugly" stimuli. Four experimental-design challenges surface. Kickoff, the options are necessarily restricted, and might non include a truly cute option—the study design tests preferences, not dazzler. 2d, unlike subjects likely interpret the instructions in radically different ways. Third, the use of different stimulus sets in different subjects makes it difficult to control for differences in low-level stimulus features, which probable drive different patterns of neural activeness. And fourth, the experiment requires that a given object retain a fixed preferred condition, and one that is non modulated by context, which nosotros know is unlikely. As Fechner showed, mere exposure changes judgments of preference in favor of the familiar pick. Brandishing fMRI does not circumvent these problems. Moreover, fMRI has cripplingly low spatial and temporal resolution, and the relationship between the measured indicate and underlying neural activeness is indirect. In add-on, fMRI experiments often just report regions that bear witness differential activation between pairs of conditions (e.g., response to cute greater than response to ugly); such an analysis is misleading in situations in which all brain regions show significant but slightly different levels of activity for the different conditions, as is likely the case in considerations of beauty. Brain imaging provides a blurry, although seductively glossy, view of brain function. And by finessing a definition of beauty, these sorts of studies sidestep what is at the heart of our interest in beauty: the connectedness between physical stimuli, specifically those crafted past human hands, and our response.

Yet, a discovery that every person's experience of beauty (yet vaguely defined) correlates with activity inside a specific brain region would be surprising, since it would seem more probable that a circuitous reaction (beautiful!) would hinge not on the absolute level of activity inside a single brain center but rather on the pattern of activity across many distributed brain regions—specifically those responsible for perception, reward, decision making, and emotion. Indeed, a broader reading of the literature reveals that the mOFC is not uniquely associated with experiences of beauty and may be neither necessary nor sufficient for these experiences. The mOFC appears to exist role of a large network of brain regions that subserves all value judgments. For example, elevated activity within the mOFC is reported in studies of neuroeconomics in which subjects are asked to assign value to a selection of choices and are never asked to consider the beauty of the choices [11],[28]–[30]. The mOFC has also been implicated in impulse control and self-regulation [31], in changing decision thresholds that influence whether data should be expressed in an evaluation [32], in attentional processes that underlie emotion-coinciding judgment [33], and in moral decision making [34]. Ascribing responses of the mOFC to experiences of beauty is premature; many experiences depend on these processes without being beautiful [27],[35]–[38].

If the mOFC plays a disquisitional part in mediating dazzler, one might expect that strokes of the region would impair experiences of dazzler. Strokes of the mOFC are rare, but the limited show suggests they bear upon self-related systems such as self-evaluation [39],[40] and do non touch on a person's power to experience dazzler. Alternatively, strokes in other encephalon regions can, paradoxically, enhance creativity, providing support for the notion that the expression of dazzler depends on a broad, distributed network. Frontotemporal dementia can produce an acquired obsessiveness that is often linked to enhanced fine art production, usually of extremely detailed works [41]. In addition, strokes of the left hemisphere, which often cause aphasia, can produce hyperexpressiveness [42].

What Questions Can Neuroaesthetics Respond?

Inspired by the power of polling, in 1994 a pair of artists, Komar and Melamid, set out to determine "USA's most wanted painting." The painting was formulated on the basis of a k people's responses to questions of their favorite color, favorite setting, and favorite subjects. The resulting painting is absurd, showing that a composition with everything that people find beautiful does not make a beautiful painting. Rational reductionist approaches to the neural footing for beauty run a similar hazard of pushing the round block of beauty into the square hole of science and may well distill out the very thing one wants to understand. At that place is a pop formulation of beauty as a fixed aspect of objects, a notion that much of current neuroaesthetics depends upon. But there is a stardom between abstruse notions of beauty and our experience of information technology—consider a specific example in which you have experienced beauty. Beauty is an analog, not binary, condition that varies in complex ways with exposure, context, attention, and rest—as do about perceptual responses. In trying to crack the subjective beauty nut with scientific, objective information, we too run the take a chance of fueling a normative, perchance unsafe campaign through which scientific discipline is required to valorize our feel. Should we deny someone's experience of dazzler if the mOFC is not activated? Obviously non. But the question underscores the danger of reverse inference, a technique used in encephalon-imaging studies which posits that activation of a brain region indicates the presence of a stimulus [43]. Reverse inference is almost ever invalid because unmarried brain structures almost never regulate single specific experiences.

Insofar as beauty is a product of the brain, correlations between brain activity and experiences of beauty must be. At what spatial scale, and within what brain regions, do nosotros find these correlations? What functions do the encephalon regions implicated serve in other behaviors? What signals during development and experience are responsible for wiring upwardly these circuits? And perhaps most critically, how does the activity of these circuits integrate across modalities and fourth dimension to bring about the dynamic, elusive quality of beauty? To address these questions, the field is thirsty for carefully conducted experiments that distinguish responses to beauty from those involved in more full general value-based decision tasks such as self-evaluation or selecting a juice for lunch. Merely whatever such experiments are caught on the same stubborn thorn—the lack of a cogent, universally accepted definition of dazzler. One should not ever demand a precise definition to make headway, but it might turn out that the philosophers' disagreement is symptomatic: maybe at that place is no universal concept beyond the human capacity to experience dazzler. Our circumspection about neuroscience'due south focus on beauty differs from the skepticism that attended scientific study of other subjective phenomena such as illusory contours (or even consciousness); in the instance of illusory contours, the subjective experience to a given physical stimulus is universal. Then, what is neuroaesthetics supposed to report?

Experiences of beauty typically require attention and are accompanied past feelings of pleasance [xi],[27],[44]. In the same style that basic studies at the interface of sensory neuroscience and fine art accept been productive—non in addressing why art objects are beautiful simply in uncovering the strategies that artists use to generate artwork—basic investigations of the mechanisms of attention, determination making, reward, and emotion [11],[28],[29],[45]–[47] could inform neuroaesthetics. The field volition benefit from developing models relating observations from the humanities to the careful neuroscience that has uncovered computations at cellular resolution inside the value-judging structures of the monkey brain. These structures, not coincidentally, are coordinating to those identified in fMRI studies of dazzler in humans. Some neurons within these structures encode the value of the choices on offer, while others encode the value of the selected choice. Moreover, the neurons adjust on unlike timescales, displaying "menu-invariant" firing at short timescales and adaptable behavior on longer timescales. This adaptation may account for our ability to make choices beyond vastly different scales, for example from a eating house carte in 1 instance and from houses offered for auction in the adjacent case [48]. It seems entirely reasonable—even likely—that these neurons are likewise implicated in the thorny chore of deciding what is beautiful. Reformulated in this way, neuroaesthetics is decoupled from beauty and can exploit advances across a range of empirical neuroscience, from sensory encoding to decision making and reward.

There may well be a "dazzler instinct" implemented by dedicated neural machinery capable of producing a multifariousness of beauty reactions, much as there is language circuitry that tin support a multitude of languages (and other operations). A need to experience beauty may be universal, but the manifestation of what constitutes beauty certainly is non. On the one hand, a neuroaesthetics that extrapolates from an assay of a few great works, or one that generalizes from a unmarried specific case of beauty, runs the risk of missing the marking. On the other, a neuroaesthetics comprising entirely subjectivist accounts may lose sight of what is specific to encounters with art. Neuroaesthetics has a great deal to offer the scientific community and general public. Its progress in uncovering a beauty instinct, if it exists, may be accelerated if the field were to abandon a pursuit of beauty per se and focus instead on uncovering the relevant mechanisms of decision making and reward and the basis for subjective preferences, much as Fechner counseled. This would mark a return to a pursuit of the mechanisms underlying sensory noesis: the original formulation of aesthetics.

Acknowledgments

We thank Caroline Jones and David Hilbert for useful discussions and as well thank the Wellesley College Neuroscience Program.

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